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PRIVATIZING FAMILY LAW IN THE NAME OF RELIGION
Robin Fretwell Wilson*
In pockets across the world, a movement has quietly taken hold to allow funda-
mentalist1 religious norms, rather than state law, to govern family matters like divorce
and inheritance.  Many of these religious norms depart significantly from the state’s
background rules protecting individuals.  Nonetheless, fundamentalist religious
understandings are given the force of law, either by treating them as binding judg-
ments arrived at through arbitration or by delegating jurisdiction to religious groups
to decide family disputes, with nominal state oversight.
This Essay explores the risks to two traditionally vulnerable groups, women and
children, when the state delegates its traditional oversight of the family to religious
authorities.2  To surface these risks, this Essay draws on two lived experiences of reli-
gious deference around the world.  Specifically, this Essay examines the eighty-five
* Class of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School
of Law. Thanks for thoughtful advice and critique to Kent Greenawalt, Edward Henneman,
Gordon Hylton, Lash LaRue, and the participants in the William and Mary Institute of Bill
of Rights Law’s Symposium on Families, Fundamentalism, & the First Amendment, the
International Society of Family Law’s panel on The Interface of Family Law and Religion,
the Southeastern Association of Law Schools’ panel on Abolishing Marriage, and the Faculty
Workshop Series at the University of Illinois College of Law. This Essay draws on Robin
Fretwell Wilson, The Perils of Privatized Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTI-
CULTURAL CONTEXT: RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION (Joel
A. Nichols ed., forthcoming 2010). I am especially indebted to Anna Katherine Moody for all
of her diligent and tireless research.
1 As used in this Essay, the terms “fundamentalist” or “conservative” generally refer to
specific sects of Christian, Islamic, and other belief groups identified as such by the social
scientists who have studied them. See, e.g., infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing
conservative Christian groups).
2 This Essay addresses only the application of religious norms to family law matters. It
does not argue against deference to all religious understandings. Society should accommodate
individual religious beliefs in a range of contexts, from the wearing of beards by Muslim pris-
oners to the respecting of holy days in employment. See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS chs. 9, 10 & 13 (2006); Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008) (arguing for religious exemp-
tions to same-sex marriage laws where no hardship results for same-sex couples). By em-
bracing multiple faiths, society combats xenophobia, refuses to segment into “us” and “them,”
and accords respect to deeply held beliefs. See GREENAWALT, supra, at 3–9 (discussing various
values that lie behind the Constitution’s religion clauses). Much of this accommodation of
individuals costs society very little. But when it comes to family matters, society has a stake
in the outcome of a family’s affairs. This Essay explores society’s interests in family affairs
involving women and children.
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Sharia courts operating in Great Britain today, which apply Islamic, not British, law
to divorce and inheritance.3  It also examines the system of shared jurisdiction in
Western Thrace, a section of Greece where three Mufti decide family disputes for
a Muslim minority of 110,000 people.4  While this Essay spotlights experiments to
enforce Islamic rather than civil understandings of family matters, numerous scholars
have advocated for deference to the religious understandings of Christian, Jewish, and
other faith groups as well.5
In both places, the civil law supplanted by fundamentalist religious norms would
provide considerably more protection to individuals in two periods of great need, upon
divorce and the death of a spouse.  As this Essay documents, these protections for the
vulnerable are hollowed out when harsh religious understandings displace the state’s
more protective rules, whether in fundamentalist Islamic families or fundamentalist
families of other faiths.  Drawing on systems of deference operating today, Part I shows
how women at divorce stand to lose custody of adolescent children and face near cer-
tain poverty if certain schools of Islamic law govern the proceeding.  Part II assesses
how a woman’s ability to exit a marital relationship, especially a violent one, may be
affected by religious deference.  This Part argues that religious deference undercuts
the state’s ability to police family violence.  Part III then shows that upon a spouse’s
death, women face equally grave and devastating results under Islamic law.  The wealth
a woman would otherwise receive upon her husband’s death under civil law shrivels
under Islamic law to a mere fraction of the decedent’s estate, leaving many women
financially at risk.  Part IV rejects two articulated justifications for schemes of religious
deference despite the inequitable treatment of women—namely, that a woman’s natal
family will support her financially when the husband does not and that women have
voluntarily accepted these outcomes.  Policymakers considering schemes of deference
in their own countries should consider these inequities before giving effect to extreme
religious views that will trap some women in poverty or abusive relationships.6
3 Steve Doughty, Britain Has 85 Sharia Courts: The Astonishing Spread of the Islamic
Justice Behind Closed Doors, DAILY MAIL, June 29, 2009, available at http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-1196165/Britain-85-sharia-courts-The-astonishing-spread-Islamic-justice
-closed-doors.html.
4 Irini Lagani, Greece’s Muslim Minority in Western Thrace, 3 BRIEFING NOTES ON
ISLAM SOC’Y & POL. 8 (2000).
5 See generally Daniel A. Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1250 (2006); Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and
Influences from New York and Louisiana, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135, 140–41 (2007);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1219 (2006); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The
Perils of Privatized Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT:
RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION (Joel A. Nichols ed.,
forthcoming 2010) (on file with author).
6 See Wilson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 10 n.27), for a description of academic proposals
urging greater religious deference and for a description of Canada’s brief flirtation with, then
rejection of, religious arbitration (noting that any arbitration in Canada by religious bodies
must now apply Canadian, not religious law).
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I. LIVED EXPERIENCES OF RELIGIOUS DEFERENCE
Two systems of religious deference operating today provide a snapshot of the
risks to women and children in such systems.  These lived experiences in Great Britain
and Western Thrace demonstrate poignantly that removing state protections from the
family is fraught with peril.
A. Great Britain’s Embrace of “Islamic” Divorce
In 2008, the British government “quietly sanctioned the powers for sharia judges
to rule on cases ranging from divorce and financial disputes to those involving domestic
violence.”7  This system of religious arbitration took root despite a firestorm of con-
troversy that erupted in early 2008 when the Archbishop of Canterbury called for
a “plural jurisdiction” in which Muslims could choose to resolve family disputes in
religious tribunals or in British courts.8  The Bishop of Rochester predicted that “[i]t
would be impossible to introduce a tradition like Sharia into [the] corpus [of British
law] without fundamentally affecting its integrity.”9
Lawmakers also reacted with alarm.  Nick Clegg, Britain’s Liberal Democrat
leader, stated that “[e]quality before the law is part of the glue that binds our society
together.  We cannot have a situation where there is one law for one person and dif-
ferent laws for another.”10  A spokesperson for the Prime Minister proclaimed that
“British law should apply in this country, based on British values.”11
Despite the controversy, eighty-five Sharia courts now operate in Great Britain,12
serving a Muslim population of more than 1.5 million people.13  These Islamic tri-
bunals capitalize on the experience of Jewish Beth Din courts that have resolved civil
cases for Orthodox Jews in Great Britain “for more than 100 years.”14  Under Great
Britain’s Arbitration Act, the judgments are civilly enforced provided both parties
agreed to binding arbitration.15
7 Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, TIMES (London), Sept. 14,
2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4749183.ece.
8 Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Foundation Lecture at the Royal Courts of
Justice: Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 2008), available
at http://www.bishopthorpepalace.co.uk/1575.
9 Ruth Gledhill & Philip Webster, Archbishop of Canterbury Argues for Islamic Law
in Britain, TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
comment/faith/article3328024.ece.
10 Id.
11 Jonathan Petre & Andrew Porter, Uproar over Archbishop’s Sharia Law Stance,
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
1578019/Uproar-over-Archbishop’s-sharia-law-stance.html.
12 See Doughty, supra note 3.
13 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2010), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html (reporting that 2.7%
of Great Britain’s 61 million citizens are Muslim).
14 See Taher, supra note 7.
15 See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 58 (Eng.).
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The overwhelming majority of Great Britain’s Muslim population is Sunni
(ninety-six percent).16  Judging by the affiliations of Britain’s mosques,17 most sub-
scribe to the Hanafi school, one of the four Sunni schools of law and one of Islam’s
seven schools.18
The substantive rules applied in Sharia courts depart significantly from British
law, with significant consequences for women.  In some Sunni schools, there is a
“strong presumption . . . that the husband will get custody of the children in the event
of a divorce,”19 as Figure 1 shows.
Islamic Custody Rules
Sunni School of Law Custody Outcome
Hanafi Mother retains custody of boys until age seven and
girls until nine; father receives custody after this age
Shafii Child chooses custodial parent upon the child’s
attainment of discretion, which has no set age limit
Maliki Mother retains custody of boys until puberty and girls
until marriage
Hanbali Mother retains custody of boys and girls until age seven,
after which the children may choose between parents
Figure 120
16 MEHMOOD NAQSHBANDI, CITY OF LONDON POLICE, ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN:
A GUIDE FOR NON-MUSLIMS ch. 3.3.2 (2006), available at http://guide.muslimsinbritain.org/
guide3.html#3.3.2.
17 A majority of British mosques are controlled by a Hanafi sect, the Deobandis. DENIS
MACEOIN, SHARIA LAW OR ‘ONE LAW FOR ALL’? 30 (2009).
18 Islam recognizes seven distinct schools of law, four within the Sunni sect—Hanafi,
Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafii—and three in the Shia sect—Ithna-Ashari, Zaidi, and Ismaili. See
KRISTINE UHLMAN, OVERVIEW OF SHARI’A AND PREVALENT CUSTOMS IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES—
DIVORCE AND CHILD CUSTODY § 3.0 (2004), http://www.expertlaw.com/library/family_law/
islamic_custody.html#30.
These schools differ in their approach to some substantive questions. See Mohammad
H. Fadel, Political Liberalism, Islamic Family Law and Family Law Pluralism: Lessons from
New York on Family Law Arbitration, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL
CONTEXT supra note 5, at 4–5, 29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421978 (noting that
“Muslims have their own profound disagreements on the nature of marriage” and describing
among the four Sunni schools “material differences in their substantive legal doctrines”);
Figure 1.
19 Caryn Litt Wolfe, Note, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of
Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427, 448 (2006) (citing Kathleen A. Portuán Miller, The Other Side of the Coin: A Look
at Islamic Law as Compared to Anglo-American Law—Do Muslim Women Really Have
Fewer Rights Than American Women?, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65, 65, 89–90, 116 (2003)).
20 See JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 187–88 (2d ed. 1990).
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Of particular concern is what occurs when the Hanafi norm for custody governs. 
For male and female children over the age of seven and nine, respectively, a father
receives custody upon divorce.  By contrast, under British laws, custody of children
after divorce would be determined by the child’s best interests.21  Although it is true
that in the Hanbali and Shafii schools, women do not necessarily jeopardize custody
of their children by divorcing, the Hanafi school is the “most widespread and widely
applied in modern Shari’a-based legislation.”22
Imagine the Catch-22 that will result for some women when Hanafi custody rules
govern at divorce.  Consider what would happen if a father harshly disciplines his ado-
lescent son, discipline that might constitute child abuse outside that religious com-
munity.23  A mother would be powerless to help her child if the Sharia court enforces
the Hanafi religious norm as to custody.  If she stays, her son will be beaten, and if she
exits, her son remains in her husband’s care.24
Even if custody rules do not dissuade particular women from divorcing, Islamic
rules governing a couple’s finances after divorce may trap women in non-functioning
marriages.  As Figure 2 notes, a woman who ends the marriage sometimes has to buy
her way out by paying back the mahr—a payment received by her for marrying—or
by forfeiting the right to any deferred mahr that would otherwise be due.25
21 See ALISON DIDUCK & FELICITY KAGANAS, FAMILY LAW, GENDER AND THE STATE:
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 312 (2d ed. 2006). In the United States, the law of child cus-
tody has undergone a “dramatic transformation over the past 150 years” beginning “with a
powerful presumption for custody with fathers,” which was “then turned on its head over the
course of the nineteenth century” to favor mothers and finally to “recenter[ ] on a formally
gender-neutral inquiry into the ‘best interest of the child.’” David D. Meyer, The Constitutional
Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1461, 1467–68 (2006) (citing Martha
Albertson Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031,
1038 (2001)).
22 UHLMAN, supra note 18, § 3.1.
23 See infra Part II.A.
24 It is not clear that the woman even would be permitted to divorce if Islamic law applied,
absent a substantial payment to her husband. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
25 Aspasia Tsaoussi & Eleni Zervogianni, Multiculturalism and Family Law: The Case
of Greek Muslims, in EUROPEAN CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 209, 216–17
(Katharina Boele-Woelki & Tone Sverdrup eds., 2008). Many Islamic schools follow this
rule. See NASIR, supra note 20, at 122 (noting that “marriage may be dissolved by mutual con-
sent by the wife giving the husband something for her freedom,” which is known as khula,
mubaraat, or ransom, but that the husband’s unilateral right of divorce, the talaq ala mal,
“does not deprive the wife of her rights under the marriage contract, e.g. deferred dower and
maintenance”); M. Hashim Kamali, Islamic Law: Personal Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGION 4705, 4708 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005) (noting that the wife may “secure[ ]
her release from the marital tie by offering the husband financial consideration, commonly
the return of the dower”); Mosa Sayed, The Muslim Dower (Mahr) in Europe—with Special
Reference to Sweden, in EUROPEAN CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, supra,
at 187, 198 (citing an Egyptian law allowing a woman to bypass the husband’s unilateral right
of divorce but requiring that she return the mahr).
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Islamic Understandings of Divorce
• No maintenance after iddat period (roughly 3 months)
• No equitable distribution of property
• In absence of man’s fault, woman pays her way out of marriage
Figure 2
A woman receives no equitable distribution of the property acquired by the couple
during the marriage, which is usually titled in the man’s name.26  The Qur’an limits
the husband’s duty to provide maintenance, or alimony, to the iddat period, which
ends mere months after the divorce.27  All in all, the prospect of certain poverty may
tether a woman to a marriage as surely as losing her children would.
By contrast, under British law, a woman receives considerably more protection. 
There is no question that she would be entitled to divorce.28  She would be entitled
to equitable division of the couple’s assets.29  She may even qualify for alimony if she
is unable to provide for her own support.30  Thus, by deferring to religious understand-
ings of custody or financial consequences after divorce, society increases the cost to
women who seek a divorce.  This is especially problematic when a woman wants to
divorce for her own safety or the safety of her children.31
Muslim women also face unique procedural hurdles when divorcing.  Women
need corroboration of their claims in a divorce while men do not.32  Women pay
more to file for divorce, £250 versus £100 for men.33  Unless the husband agrees, a
woman needs the imam’s permission to divorce and generally needs to show the
husband’s fault.34
26 See NASIR, supra note 20, at 81 (“It is the duty of the husband to provide and the right
of the wife to have a suitable matrimonial home according to the Quranic verse: ‘Lodge them
where ye dwell, according to your wealth, and harass them not so as to straiten life for them.’
The wife should follow the husband to the matrimonial home, provided that it complies with
the Sharia requirements, that is, that it should be in accordance with the husband’s financial
standing . . . .” (quoting Surat Talaq 65:6)).
27 Id. at 148, 152–54 (citing to Surat Baqara 2:228, stating that the iddat lasts for “three
monthly courses,” but noting that individual countries have required additional
compensation—mutat—in cases of arbitrary repudiation of the wife to mitigate the rule’s
harshness); see also DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 182–84 (3d
ed. 1998).
28 See DIDUCK & KAGANAS, supra note 21, at 523–26.
29 See id. at 596–99.
30 See id. at 605.
31 See infra Part II.
32 See Edna Fernandes, Sharia Law UK: Mail on Sunday Gets Exclusive Access to a British
Muslim Court, DAILY MAIL, July 4, 2009, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-1197478/Sharia-law-UK--How-Islam-dispensing-justice-side-British-courts.html.
33 Id.
34 See NASIR, supra note 20, at 128 (describing Syrian law, derived from the Hanafi school,
requiring divorce arbiters to “award a divorce and order the full dower or a commensurate part
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For an example of the difficulties faced by women in Great Britain’s Sharia courts,
consider the experience of a woman identified in the Daily Mail as “Ameena.”35 
Ameena sought assistance from the Islamic Sharia Council to divorce her husband. 
Backed by testimony of her daughter and two women’s shelter workers, Ameena told
the imam, Dr. Hasan, that her husband “beats me and the children.”36  The imam docu-
mented the abuse including beating that caused a miscarriage.37  Although Ameena
corroborated her claims of abuse, the imam referred Ameena’s case to a council of
seven imams.38  The council decided Ameena’s husband should be given another
opportunity to reconcile with her before they would grant Ameena a divorce, if the
council did so at all.39  As of July 2009, “Ameena’s fate remain[ed] in limbo.”40
B. Shared Jurisdiction in Western Thrace
Systems of shared jurisdiction may also result in raw deals for women.  One
example of shared jurisdiction operates in Western Thrace, where the Hanafi school
also predominates.41  As a result of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed by Turkey and
Greece in 1923, Muslims in Greece enjoy unique independence from the Greek gov-
ernment.42  They maintain their own religious and legal institutions, headed by three
Muftis who “conduct all matters related to civil law” using Sharia law,43 specifically
Hanafi law.44
Hanafi law departs significantly from Greek civil law in a number of important
areas.45  A recent study of divorce within Western Thrace explains: “[U]nder Islamic
thereof to the injury” if the fault falls “mostly” or “equally” on the wife but providing that “[i]f
the injury, or most of it, is on the part of the husband, the arbiters, having failed to reconcile the
spouses, shall award an irrevocable divorce”). Adherents have also attempted to apply religious
norms to block the application of civil rules in divorce proceedings. See Aleem v. Aleem, 947
A.2d 489 (Md. 2008). In Aleem, a Muslim husband argued that his performance of talaq after
his wife filed a civil action for divorce deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to litigate the
division of the parties’ marital property. Id. at 490. The Maryland court rejected the talaq as
a proper method of divorce as it violated public policy. Id. at 502; see also Doug Rendleman,
Collecting a Libel Tourist’s Defamation Judgment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2010)
(discussing Aleem).






41 UHLMAN, supra note 18, § 3.1 (noting that the Hanafi school predominates in the
Balkans, which includes Greece).
42 See Lagani, supra note 4.
43 Id.
44 See UHLMAN, supra note 18, § 3.1.
45 See Tsaoussi & Zervogianni, supra note 25, at 209.
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law the wife must compensate her husband for the termination of the marriage . . .
by returning the dower (mahr) . . . [and] by waiving her right to alimony or even her
right to the custody of the children.”46  If the husband does not agree to the divorce,
the wife can terminate the marriage only for important reasons pertaining to fault of
the husband.47  While the Greek Muftis have accepted such fault-based reasons as a
husband’s violence, “the Mufti[s] often reject[ ] divorce applications filed by women,
who thus remain trapped in non-functioning marriages.”48
Although there is a technical possibility of divorce through Greek courts, almost
no one disputes the authority of the Mufti.  Even when a party likely faces an unfavor-
able outcome or is the weaker party, “the vast majority of cases are brought before
the Mufti.”49
On the rare occasion that someone disputes a Mufti’s decision, Greek courts rou-
tinely find the Mufti’s decision enforceable.  Greek civil courts denied enforceability
in less than one-half of one percent of cases.50  This is not surprising since civil review
of the Muftis’ judgments is limited to “whether the Mufti remained within his field
of competence and whether the law applied contravenes the [Greek] Constitution.”51 
A number of problems follow from this lack of review. There is no recourse from the
Mufti’s judgment, nor is there any guarantee that like cases will be treated alike.52
As the next Part explains, these harsh rules53 exacerbate a woman’s ability to
exit a marriage in cases of violence in the family.
46 Id. at 216–17. Though academics who advocate for greater religious deference in
family matters would draw the line at respecting religious understandings about custody
because of the state’s paramount interest in protecting children, see Robin Fretwell Wilson,
The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363 (2007), this
is not the practice in Western Thrace.
47 See NASIR, supra note 20, at 128 (“If the injury, or most of it, is on the part of the hus-
band, the arbiters, having failed to reconcile the spouses, shall award an irrevocable divorce.”).
48 Tsaoussi & Zervogianni, supra note 25, at 217.
49 Id. at 221.
50 Id. at 219–20 (stating that civil courts “denied enforceability in only 11 cases out of
2,679”).
51 Id. at 214.
52 See id. at 221.
53 In some countries, such as Egypt, Islamic courts have at times rejected rigid applications
of Sharia law. See Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring
Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles
Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 423, 425 (2006)
(noting that “[i]n dicta, the SCC [Egyptian Supreme Court] has argued that Islamic law is, for
constitutional purposes, a source of general moral principles that must be interpreted anew
in every day and age and must take evolving notions of human welfare into account” and that
in a number of cases, the SCC has upheld “as ‘Islamic’ legislation that requires husbands to
pay alimony, legislation that provides women with a right to retroactive child support and
legislation that provides Egyptian women with the right to dissolve their marriage for ‘harm’
if their husband takes a second wife” (internal citations omitted)). Yet even these more “liberal”
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II. THE COLLISION OF RELIGIOUS NORMS WITH FAMILY VIOLENCE
A growing body of research54 shows that family violence occurs in religious com-
munities, like it does throughout society.  When it occurs in religious communities,
the victims often receive little or no support for exiting the marriage from religious
leaders and other members.  This Part captions select social scientific studies of each
phenomenon, drawing on empirical studies of Islamic and fundamentalist Christian
communities.55  Studies of other faith groups, such as Orthodox Jewish groups, show
similar patterns.56
A. Family Violence in Fundamentalist Religious Households
Studies of domestic violence risk factors find that religion is weakly protective of
adherents from violence.57  Nonetheless, religious observers across a number of belief
systems are not free of family violence.  For instance, Dr. Muhammad Haj-Yahia
studied 291 married Arab women in Israel, the majority of whom were Muslim.58  In
that study, “[81%] of the participants knew of women who had experienced verbal and
psychological abuse by their husbands; [while] 78% knew of Arab women who had
experienced ‘moderate physical violence’ (slapping, pulling hair or clothes, pushing).”59 
Nearly two-thirds of those surveyed, sixty-four percent, knew Arab women who had
courts remain committed to Sharia. See id. at 418–25 (discussing the Egyptian Supreme Court’s
methods of identifying rules and goals of Sharia which the state must respect). More funda-
mentally, the actual experience of women in the two systems of deference described in this
Essay shows that rigid religious understandings of custody and the financial consequences
of divorce, when applied, increase the cost to women who seek a divorce. See supra Part I.
54 Researchers have found it difficult to measure the incidence of family violence within
religious and cultural groups. See, e.g., Anahid Dervartanian Kulwicki & June Miller, Domestic
Violence in the Arab American Population: Transforming Environmental Conditions Through
Community Education, 20 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 199, 204 (1999) (using home
interviews to study domestic violence among Arab Americans “[b]ecause of the high per-
centage of illiteracy . . . [and] the reluctance of Arab Americans to discuss sensitive questions
outside their homes”).
55 This Part highlights the risk of family violence in a variety of fundamentalist faith groups
because scholars have advocated greater religious deference for many faith groups, including
Islamic, Christian, and Jewish groups. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
56 See Wilson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 41 n.128, 50 n.160).
57 For example, a 1999 study by Christopher Ellison and colleagues found that men and
women who attend religious services regularly are less likely to commit acts of domestic vio-
lence than persons who attend rarely or not at all. See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Are There
Religious Variations in Domestic Violence?, 20 J. FAM. ISSUES 87, 87–113, 104 (1999) (“[T]he
frequency of attending religious services bears an inverse relationship to the likelihood of per-
petrating abuse for both men and women.”); see also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
58 Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, Wife Abuse and Battering in the Sociocultural Context of
Arab Society, 39 FAM. PROCESS 237, 242 (2000).
59 Id. at 244.
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experienced “severe physical violence,” defined as “hard pushing at frequent intervals,
attacking the wife and throwing her body against the wall, or attacking the wife with
a hard object such as a chair, belt, or stick.”60
Figure 3
At least some Muslim enclaves in the United States have cultural norms accepting
of domestic violence.  A 1999 study by two researchers, Kulwicki and Miller, exam-
ined views of Arab American immigrants in the United States, nearly all of whom were
Muslim.61  The researchers asked women and men when it would be appropriate for
husbands to slap their wives.62  Women, shown in black in Figure 3, were more
accepting of this practice than men, shown in gray, in a number of different circum-
stances.  These circumstances ranged from when a wife disrespects her husband in
the home when no one else is around, the second set of bars in Figure 3,63 to when
“When Is it Appropriate for 





do what he 









She hits him 
first when 
they argue He learns she has 






61 Kulwicki & Miller, supra note 54, at 207 tbl.1 (reporting that 97.51% of survey
respondents were Muslim).
62 Id. at 209 tbl.3.
63 See id. (showing that 34.8% of female and 33.3% of male respondents would approve
of a man slapping his wife if she insults him when they are at home alone).
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the husband discovers that his wife is cheating, the last set of bars in Figure 3.64 
Perhaps most alarming, 18.2% of women in the study said they would approve of
a husband killing his wife if he discovered adultery,65 as the black arrow shows.
Men share these views as well.  In another study, nearly a quarter, and sometimes
nearly two-thirds of the male respondents, justified wife beating because of “sexual
infidelity, insulting the husband in front of his friends, challenging [his] manhood,
disobeying the husband,” and a variety of other reasons.66
Just as some adherents of Islam live with domestic violence, so, too, do members
of conservative Christian sects.  Using the second National Survey of Families and
Households, University of Virginia Professor Brad Wilcox compared rates of family
violence between conservative Protestant67 married men with children and mainline
Protestant men and unaffiliated men.68  Wilcox found that “[n]ominal conservative
Protestants husbands have a domestic violence rate of 7.2 percent and are significantly
more abusive than unaffiliated husbands, active conservative Protestant husbands,
and nominal mainline Protestant husbands.”69
64 See id. (showing that 48.4% of female and 22.5% of male respondents approve of a
man slapping his wife if he learns that she had an affair). Researchers also asked if it would
be appropriate for a man to slap his wife when:
Would you approve of a man slapping his
wife if:
% Females Yes % Males Yes
     She won’t do what he tells her to do 20.4 5.1
     She insults him in public 17.2 43.6
     She comes home drunk 56.3 51.4
     She hits him first when they have an argument 58.7 59.0
Id.
65 Id. The sample was not large enough to present parallel statistics for men on this
question.
66 Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, Beliefs About Wife Beating Among Arab Men From Israel:
The Influence of Their Patriarchal Ideology, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 193, 194 (2003); id. at
199 (“[A] substantial proportion of the [male] respondents justified wife beating. Fifty-eight
percent strongly agreed or agreed that ‘there is no excuse for a man to beat his wife’ . . .
whereas about 28% strongly agreed or agreed that ‘sometimes it is OK for a man to beat his
wife’ . . . . Moreover, between 15 and 62% strongly agreed or agreed that wife beating is jus-
tified on certain occasions.”); see also Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, A Patriarchal Perspective
of Beliefs About Wife Beating Among Arab Palestinian Men from the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, 19 J. FAM. ISSUES 595, 604–05 (1998).
67 W. BRADFORD WILCOX, SOFT PATRIARCHS, NEW MEN: HOW CHRISTIANITY SHAPES
FATHERS AND HUSBANDS 15–16 (2004) (classifying as “conservative” any denomination that
“adhere[s] to a theologically conservative worldview,” including Pentecostals, Baptists,
Anabaptists, Southern Baptists, Churches of God in Christ, and Reformed Churches).
“Conservative” Protestants attended church more regularly than “mainline” ones. Id. at 16
& tbl.1.2.
68 See id. at 181–82.
69 Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 30–32) (collecting other studies of
Christian groups).
936 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:925
Risks of violence in religious communities extend to children as well.  A study
of child sexual abuse by researcher Rebecca Bolen found that Protestant and Catholic
children had less child sexual abuse risk than children in other families, especially
when very young.70  But when analyzed across the years of childhood, that risk spiked
in adolescence, as Figure 4 illustrates.71  Specifically, the risk of sexual abuse for
children raised as Protestants, shown in Figure 4, spikes in late adolescence, while
the risk for Catholic children spikes in the early teens.72  The increase in risk for
observant adolescents is on par with other factors that one intuitively grasps can affect
a child’s risk of sexual abuse, as when a girl lives with males in the household after
her parents divorce.73
Figure 474

















70 See Rebecca M. Bolen, Predicting Risk to Be Sexually Abused: A Comparison of
Logistic Regression to Event History Analysis, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 157, 164 fig.6, 167
(1998). Bolen did not capture the identity of the perpetrator of the abuse. Some of it may have
been intrafamilial, some extrafamilial. See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of
Abuse: Evaluating the Danger Posed by a Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings,
51 EMORY L.J. 241 (2002). In this discussion, child sexual abuse may spark a mother’s desire
to exit the marriage if it occurs within the family.
71 See Bolen, supra note 70, at 164 fig.6.
72 Id.
73 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children
After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 255 (2001).
74 This figure is adapted from the Bolen study. See Bolen, supra note 70.
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Child physical abuse also marks religious communities.  Professors Christopher
Dyslin and Cynthia Thomsen have examined whether religious affiliation or religiosity
are related to child physical abuse risk.75  They distinguished mere spanking from child
physical abuse, which they defined as “entail[ing] more extreme forms of physical
aggression,” such as “being hit with a fist, burned, or choked.”76  Dyslin and Thomsen
found that while “Conservative Protestant”77 religious affiliation was not related to
child physical abuse risk,78 “[i]ndividuals with high levels of extrinsic religiosity had
higher [child-abuse tendencies]” than those with lower extrinsic religiosity.79  Extrinsic
religiosity is akin to wearing one’s religion on one’s sleeve; it places an emphasis on
religion as membership in a “powerful in-group,”80 providing protection, consolation,
and social status.81
While Dyslin and Thomsen restricted their inquiry to more severe acts of abuse,
such as choking and burning, other researchers have examined links between religion
and simple corporal punishment.  The overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that
certain religious adherents resort to corporal punishment far more often than other
parents.82
Clearly, family violence afflicts some religious communities, as it does society
generally.83  More disturbing for the idea of giving deference to religious groups
75 Christopher W. Dyslin & Cynthia J. Thomsen, Religiosity and Risk of Perpetrating Child
Physical Abuse: An Empirical Investigation, 33 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 291, 292–93 (2005)
(measuring participants’ attitudes towards abuse with the Child Abuse Potential Inventory
rather than with self-reports of behavior).
76 Id. at 292.
77 Dyslin and Thomsen classified the following denominations as Conservative Protestants:
“Adventist, Assemblies of God, Baptist, Church of God in Christ, Evangelical Free, Foursquare
Gospel, Full Gospel, Holiness, Missouri or Wisconsin Synod Lutheran, Nazarene, Non-
denominational (Evangelical), Pentecostal, and Wesleyan.” Id. at 293 n.2.
78 Compare id. at 295–96, with Bette L. Bottoms et al., Religion-Related Child Physical
Abuse: Characteristics and Psychological Outcomes, 8 J. AGGRESSION MALTREATMENT &
TRAUMA 87, 90 (2003) (finding in a survey of nearly 650 members of the Christian Reformed
Church that “church attendance was inversely related to reported perpetration of child abuse”).
79 Dyslin & Thomsen, supra note 75, at 296 (emphasis added).
80 Vicky Genia & Dale G. Shaw, Religion, Intrinsic-Extrinsic Orientation, and Depression,
32 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 274, 274 (1991).
81 See Gordon W. Allport & J. Michael Ross, Personal Religious Orientation and
Prejudice, 5 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 434 (1967).
82 See Wilson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 43–46 nn. 141–50 and accompanying text)
(collecting studies and theological texts supporting corporal punishment).
83 As I and others have argued elsewhere, religious exemptions in the context of the family
will sometimes serve to rob women and children of the state’s protection. See, e.g., Wilson,
supra note 5 (manuscript at 10) (“In a majority of U.S. states, religious understandings of
family duties currently govern in one significant context, the medical treatment of children.
The state’s choice to turn a blind eye to parental refusals to treat dying children has yielded
tragic results.”); see also MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE
RULE OF LAW 274 (2005) (arguing that the rule of law should apply “to religious entities as
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is that religious leaders often tolerate this domestic violence, as the next subpart
documents.
B. Discouraging Exit From Abusive Relationships
Religious leaders across many traditions actively discourage the victims of family
violence from exiting the marriage.  A trio of studies of Christian groups illustrate
the degree of this tolerance of domestic violence.  A 2000 study of 158 Christian reli-
gious leaders found that many believed “marriage must be saved at all costs”—even
when domestic violence occurs—and that a realistic solution for victims included
“forgiving and forgetting the abuse.”84
In a second study, eighty percent of women abused in their marriages who asked
clergy for advice received only religious advice or, because it is a wife’s duty to for-
give, were told to return home or to seek marriage counseling.85  A third study, a 1988
survey of conservative Protestant pastors, found that ninety-two percent would “never
advise a woman to divorce an abuser.”86
Many Jewish and Muslim religious leaders also prize the “sanctity” of the mar-
riage over the victim’s safety.87  In all these settings, it is “especially difficult for
it is applied to all others” and that the “governing law should not be one that any one individual
decides according to his or her own perspective, but rather a set of laws created by duly
enacted legislatures charged with consideration of the public good”). For an argument that
religious exemptions may be consistent with the rule of law, see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule
of Law and the Exemption Strategy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 (2009).
84 Colleen Shannon-Lewy & Valerie T. Dull, The Response of Christian Clergy to
Domestic Violence: Help or Hindrance?, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 647, 649
(2005) (quoting AL MILES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: WHAT EVERY PASTOR NEEDS TO KNOW
149–50 (2000)).
85 Mildred Daley Pagelow, Secondary Battering and Alternatives of Female Victims to
Spouse Abuse, in WOMEN AND CRIME IN AMERICA 277, 287–88 (Lee H. Bowker ed., 1981).
86 Shannon-Lewy & Dull, supra note 84, at 651 (citing James M. Alsdurf & Pamela
Alsdurf, A Pastoral Response, in ABUSE AND RELIGION: WHEN PRAYING ISN’T ENOUGH
165, 168 (Anne L. Horton & Judith A. Williamson eds., 1988)).
87 See Linda L. Ammons, What’s God Got to Do With It? Church and State Collaboration
in the Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1207 (1999).
“Jewish women tend to stay in abusive relationships longer th[a]n non-Jews,” largely because
of community pressure to maintain peace in the home or “shalom bayit.” Id. at 1269 n.377
(quoting Debra Darvick, To Have and To Harm, FORWARD FAM., Nov. 8, 1996, at 1).
In much the same way, Professor Ruksana Ayyub explains that the Muslim community
“condemns any woman who seeks legal protection from an abusive spouse.” Ruksana Ayyub,
Domestic Violence in the South Asian Muslim Immigrant Population in the United States,
9 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 237, 242 (2000). Professor Ayyub also notes that, among
South Asian Muslims in the United States, “[v]iolence in marriage is generally condemned
but when it does happen the religious community gives no clear consequences for the violent
behavior.” Id. Researcher Haj-Yahia notes that an Arab woman who seeks removal of her hus-
band from the home “may be ostracized by [her] community and blamed for undermining
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religious victims to see the full extent of their suffering or to sound out the call for
help.”88
Obviously, the State faces significant challenges in policing family violence.  The
best hope for safeguarding family members is to empower women to act as private
attorneys general, regulating conduct with respect to themselves and their children. 
Providing a financial safety net at divorce—as the state’s off-the-rack rules do—is
essential to preserving a woman’s ability to exit, as are custody rules that do not
automatically strip women of daily contact with and care of their children.89
III. PROTECTION OF DEPENDENTS UPON DEATH
Just as women may be worse off when religious rules are applied upon divorce,
so too are they likely to be in the context of inheritance.90  The Anglo-American
family stability and unity.” Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, Wife Abuse and Battering in the
Sociocultural Context of Arab Society, 39 FAM. PROCESS 237, 238 (2000). Haj-Yahia attributes
ostracism of the wife to “the prevailing belief that the children’s best interest [and her family’s
reputation] take precedence over her own well-being and safety.” Id. at 239–40. As I noted
in a previous article, “[p]reserving the marriage is of such great importance that physical vio-
lence is viewed as ‘preferable to divorce.’” Wilson, supra note 46, at 1376 & n.79 (quoting
S. Douki et al., Violence Against Women in Arab and Islamic Countries, 6 ARCHIVES WOMEN’S
MENTAL HEALTH 165, 169 (2003)).
88 Nancy Nason-Clark, When Terror Strikes at Home: The Interface Between Religion
and Domestic Violence, 43 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 303, 304 (2004).
89 Importantly, raising the costs of exit for women in cases of family violence undercuts
powers that liberal states have not ceded and will not cede to religious courts, for example,
the decision to prosecute domestic violence. For instance, many states have instituted “no drop”
policies for domestic violence, which “mandate prosecution of abusers, even if the victims
do not wish to proceed.” Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 581, 649 (2009). The objective of these policies is to take offenders out of the home and
community. By removing the offender’s opportunity to convince a victim to dismiss the
charges, such policies serve to empower victims, who can feel confident that domestic vio-
lence will not be tolerated by the state. J. Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim
Autonomy at the International Criminal Court, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 384–85 (2007).
If a legally enforceable religious tradition hobbles a battered spouse’s ability to leave the
relationship, many women likely will not report family violence, undercutting the state’s scheme
for sanctioning family violence. In this way, it is possible that religious deference will either
(1) make things worse for women in groups the state is trying to support, or (2) dramatically
affect the state’s real-world willingness to exercise the authority it has retained for itself—for
example, by increasing the unwillingness of police and prosecutors to pursue charges against
a violent husband if they know that the wife will be unable to exit the marriage.
90 Muslims in Great Britain could apply Sharia law to matters of succession even before
the eighty-five Sharia Courts began to operate. PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 486
(“Muslims in Britain who want to ensure that Muslim law applies to an inheritance in
England, rather than the English legal rules, have basically two options, either to make a will
laying down that succession should take place in accordance with Muslim law . . . or to dis-
tribute their property inter vivos.”). Presumably, if a decedent does not take these steps, his son
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system protects the welfare of citizens through inheritance schemes that favor the
surviving spouse, regardless of gender.91  But, as this Part documents, some religious
norms preclude a widow from inheriting more than a limited fraction of the husband’s
estate, pushing wives onto the state’s safety net.  Specifically, under Islamic inheri-
tance rules, surviving female spouses receive a fraction of what they would receive
under Anglo-American law.92  By contrast under British law, the surviving spouse gets
a substantial portion of the estate.93
It is important to review briefly the modern changes in Anglo-American intestacy
law before considering how the application of religious norms will significantly dis-
advantage women.  In the United States, each state has developed its own law gov-
erning the division of property upon a spouse’s death.94  Property may be willed by
or other family member could enlist the Sharia court to apply Islamic law upon his death. Cf.
MARION BOYD, CANADIAN MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION (2004) (discussing arbitration
of inheritance cases before Canada prohibited religious arbitration using religious rules).
91 A relatively recent twentieth-century phenomenon, the spouse’s elevation to the role of
primary heir is one of the most significant changes in the American law of inheritance. Histori-
cally, spouses provided for one another through the marital estates of dower and curtesy rather
than through inheritance. Through a dower, the woman would be entitled to a life estate in one-
third of her deceased husband’s land (or, more precisely, of the land of which he was seized of
an estate of inheritance during the marriage), with title to the real estate going to the children,
not to the surviving spouse. See RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING
FAMILY 13–14 (2004); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 42–43 (2d. ed. 2001). A widow could receive one-third to one-half of her
spouse’s personal property, depending on whether the decedent had children. A widower, on
the other hand, received rights to his wife’s personal property upon marriage rather than death.
MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra, at 43. This distribution scheme reflected society notions that
“[u]nderlying a woman’s status was a concept of a woman as a man’s ‘property’—a concept
applicable not only to the married woman, but also to the single woman, as well, who was
subject to her father’s control preceding her marriage.” 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982). In this distribution scheme, a wife’s
inheritance was limited to a life estate for fear that “if the surviving spouse inherited land in
fee it would be permanently removed from the decedent’s family, particularly if the couple
had no children or if the surviving spouse remarried or had children by another marriage.”
MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra, at 42–43.
By contrast, the modern model generally confers an “outright (fee simple) share of the
decedent’s property . . . [and d]istinctions between widows and widowers have disappeared,
and would be of doubtful constitutionality today.” Id. at 43.
92 Mary F. Radford, The Inheritance Rights of Women Under Jewish and Islamic Law,
23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 135, 184 (2000) (“Western cultures . . . have come close in
modern times to achieving sex equality in [intestacy] law while, at the same time, a resur-
gence of fundamentalism in . . . Islam . . . threatens to visit new and even greater inequities
on women.”). The illustrations in this Part also make this point.
93 See infra note 113 and accompanying chart.
94 See Portuán Miller, supra note 19, at 116–17. The underlying rationale for intestacy
statutes is widely disputed. Some maintain that the statutes attempt to provide default rules
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the decedent, but if the decedent does not act, his or her property will be distributed
according to the state’s intestacy laws.  As a general rule, spouses in community
property states—that is, states that consider property acquired during the marriage
to be owned by both spouses95—may devise in a will only one-half of the community
property, with the other half belonging to the surviving spouse.96  One spouse may
will to the other his or her half of the community property, as well as any other prop-
erty acquired outside of the marriage; but, he or she generally may also elect to omit
the spouse completely.97
In non-community property states, each spouse may devise his or her property in
its entirety to whomever he or she wishes.  However, with the exception of one state,
that effect the devises most decedents would have wanted to make. Others argue that the shift
served societal welfare, including the protection of financially dependent family members.
See Radford, supra note 92, at 136 (discussing the history of inheritance laws in Western
society and concluding that the modern Anglo-American trend affords a widow the right
to be supported after the death of her husband); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in
Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033–37
(2004) (explaining the underlying reasoning behind state intestacy statute trends and concluding
that “every conceivable preference—that of the decedent, that of survivors, that of society—all
mixed together” factors into modern intestacy laws).
This debate over the driving force behind modern Anglo-American intestacy statutes
may be an academic exercise here since both rationales will yield the same results in many
instances. For example, since the Statute of Wills, property owners who fail to exercise the
right of testamentary control relinquish to the state the right to distribute the property in a way
that best serves the purpose of social and economic stability; in the case of spouses, this fre-
quently will result in distributing the property to the deceased’s immediate family members,
who then can remain independent without need of public support. See Mary Louise Fellows
et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws
in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 324 (finding that two of the four major
societal aims in estate distribution are “to protect the financially dependent family” and “to
promote and encourage the nuclear family”). By the same token, presumably most spouses
would intend to provide for the care of their husband or wife upon their death had they acted.
See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 91, at 43 (“Empirical data suggests that most people
want a larger share to pass to the spouse than the former rules provided.”).
95 See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 47–49 (3d ed. 2005).
96 See Portuán Miller, supra note 19, at 118 n.337 (citing McMurry v. Stanley, 6 S.W.
412, 415 (Tex. 1887), as a case that exemplifies community property rules governing the
division of property).
97 While a decedent in a community property state may disinherit his or her spouse, the sur-
viving spouse will still retain ownership over her half of the community property. MCGOVERN
& KURTZ, supra note 91, at 149. Thus, in instances of brief marriages in which the couple
accrues minimal community assets, it may be possible for one spouse virtually to disinherit
the other spouse. The harshness of this rule is muted in most community property states by
statutory minimums to which the surviving spouse is entitled, even if there is no community
property. Id. (“[S]ome have criticized the community property system for failing to give a
needy surviving spouse any rights in the decedent’s separate property. The Uniform Probate
Code attempts to meet this objection by including in the elective share an additional amount
to reflect the ‘spouses’ mutual duties of support.” (internal citations omitted)).
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if the decedent does not provide a certain amount for the surviving spouse, he or she
can petition to take a forced elective share, which is generally one-half to one-third
of the estate.98
In the absence of a will, Anglo-American intestate law provides significant, con-
crete protection for dependent spouses.  In most states today in the U.S., a surviving
spouse of any gender takes the entire intestate estate unless there are surviving children
of the deceased who have a different parent other than the survivor.99  British law
also allows a surviving spouse to challenge a testamentary distribution in favor of
an intestate one.100
Unlike the Anglo-American system, which provides a generous safety net for
the surviving spouse, Islamic law gives widows a slim fraction of the entire estate. 
Because the Qur’an limits any person from devising more than one-third of his estate,101
the intestacy distribution scheme affects every estate under Islamic law.  Just as critical,
Sunni law, which governs ninety percent of the world’s Muslims, forbids any named
heir, including wives, from taking under a will,102 leaving only intestate distribution
98 See Portuán Miller, supra note 19, at 118 n.340 (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 395 (4th ed. 1998)). Elective statutory shares are available in every state
except Georgia. See id. at 118. In Georgia, a disinherited spouse, or one that receives very
little from the deceased, is not entitled to an elective share. Id.
The elective share is generally a fraction of the probate estate or, in Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) jurisdictions—Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah—the augmented estate. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE, § 2-202(a) (1993). Because elective shares in non-UPC states can vary and because
the distribution of every estate involves its own unique circumstances, it ultimately may be
possible to disinherit a spouse despite these legislative safeguards. See BRASHIER, supra note
91, at 14–18 (illustrating the disparate outcomes that can result from a spouse invoking the
elective share).
99 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1)(ii) (1993); cf. infra note 113 (discussing British intes-
tacy laws). As this discussion shows, in the United States, surviving spouses with children
in common with the decedent are potentially much better off under most American intestacy
statutes than they are under the law of the United Kingdom. For example, in a situation where
a spouse dies with $10 million worth of real property and children by the surviving spouse
only, in the United States, the surviving spouse gets it all. In the United Kingdom, the surviving
spouse gets only about $400,000 (£250,000) and a life estate in $4.8 million worth of real
estate. While this is a lot, it is not as much as under U.S. law. On the other hand, under U.K.
law, the rest goes to the surviving spouse’s children, which is where it would likely end up
anyway after his or her death.
100 See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, c. 63, § 1 (Eng.).
101 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 449 (“There are two restrictions on the power to
make bequests. The two rules dealing with ultra vires bequests in Sunni law are that no
bequests can be made which involve disposition beyond one third of the net estate (unless
the heirs agree) and that no bequest can be made in favour of an heir.”).
102 See id.; see also Radford, supra note 92, at 168 (“Under Islamic law, an individual is
allowed to bequeath up to one-third of his estate. The Sunni system prohibits this one-third
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for wives.  The Qur’an provides that the wife may never inherit more than one-fourth
of the estate.103  Her small share is slashed in half to one-eighth of the estate if her
deceased husband leaves any children, whether in common with the surviving spouse
or not.104  In the event of multiple wives, the wife’s share is split evenly among the
wives, instead of each receiving her own share as a wife.105  Although women may
also inherit from their fathers or male relatives, their inheritance is limited by complex
rules governing their fractional share.106  So, for example, in inheriting from a parent,
a woman may receive only half the amount received by her brother.107
A series of concrete hypotheticals best illustrate the disparity in the widow’s intes-
tate share that results from applying Islamic rather than civil law.108  Assume first
that a Sunni man dies in Great Britain, leaving an estate of £100,000 ($159,812.76).109 
from being bequeathed to any family member who is named in the Qur’anic framework.”
(internal citations omitted)).
103 Surat An-Nisā’ 4:12, available at http://quran.com/4 (“And for the wives is one fourth
if you [the husband] leave no child. But if you leave a child, then for them is an eighth of what
you leave, after any bequest you [may have] made or debt.”).
104 See id.
105 See NASIR, supra note 20, at 208.
106 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 457 (describing the outcomes of various scenarios).
107 Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:11 (“Allah instructs you concerning your children:
for the male, what is equal to the share of two females.”).
It is possible that any given woman could net more financially under Islamic rules if the
size of her mandatory inheritance from her father, brother, son or other natal relatives—when
combined with the paltry sum she receives from her deceased husband—exceeds what she
would receive upon her husband’s death and the death of other relatives under civil law. See
PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 456–63 (discussing a woman’s inheritance from her
father). But because we cannot know and predict when these different deaths may occur, and
what the size of each decedent’s estate will be, the possibility of natal inheritance does not erase
risk of grave financial need upon the death of her husband.
108 The outcomes of each hypothetical were checked against the Islamic Inheritance
Program. See IRTH: The Islamic Inheritance Program, http://www.islamicsoftware.org/irth/
irth.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). The hypotheticals are set in Great Britain because a
system of religious deference now operates there. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
This Essay focuses on intestate succession because it provides for dependents when the dece-
dent did not make a provision himself. See JANET FINCH ET AL., WILLS, INHERITANCE, AND
FAMILIES, 24–26 (1996) (“[T]he key restrictions on testamentary freedom introduced during
the twentieth century have been intended specifically to protect the close family of the testator
from the possibility of exclusion from the will. . . . [The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act
1938 and the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975] have served to
emphasise that inheritance is not only about passing property down the generations. It is also—
importantly—now about marriage and the financial responsibilities of spouses for each other.”).
Obviously, a testator could undercut the degree of financial support for a widow by making
a will that is less generous than what she would receive in the absence of a will, cabined of
course by any right the widow has to receive an elective share. See supra notes 89–90 (discuss-
ing wills), 97 (discussing elective shares) and accompanying text.
109 All conversions from British pounds to U.S. dollars were performed on the Universal
Currency Calculator, available at http://www.xe.com/ucc/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
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He is survived by his wife, mother, and father.  Applying Islamic intestacy law, the
father receives £50,000 ($79,906.38),110 the mother receives £25,000 ($39,966.14),111
and the wife is left with only £25,000 ($39,966.14).112  Under Islamic law, the dece-
dent could not have forestalled this paltry award to his widow because he cannot make
a devise by will to a named heir.  In sharp contrast, British intestacy law would award
the surviving wife the entire estate, or £100,000 ($159,832.30).113
Even skimpier awards result in polygamous marriages, when a man leaves mul-
tiple widows.  Consider the result in the first hypothetical if the man had taken four
wives, which is permissible under the Qur’an.114  Under Islamic intestacy law, the
father receives £50,000 ($79,906.38),115 the mother receives £25,000 ($39,966.14),116
and the wives end up with £6,250 ($9,990.39) apiece.117  Under British law, the
mother and father receive nothing and the wives together would receive £100,000
($159,812.76), with each wife presumably taking £25,000 ($39,966.14).118
110 See Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:11; PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 457
(discussing the father as the agnatic heir). The outcomes of each hypothetical were checked
against the Islamic Inheritance Program. See IRTH: The Islamic Inheritance Program, supra
note 108.
111 See Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:11; see PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 457.
112 See Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:12.
113 See The Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order, 2009, S.I. 2009/135, art 2 (U.K.),




Survivors Distribution to spouse
< £250,000 Spouse All to spouse
> £250,000 Spouse and children £250,000 to spouse, personal chattels
absolutely, life interest in ½ of the
remaining estate
< £450,000 Spouse and no children All to spouse
> £450,000 Spouse and decedent’s parents
and/or brothers and sisters
£450,000 to spouse, personal chattels




Spouse and no children,
parents, brothers or sisters
All to spouse
114 See Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:3 (“[M]arry those that please you of [other]
women, two or three or four.”).
115 See id. at 4:11.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 4:12; IRTH: The Islamic Inheritance Program, supra note 108.
118 See The Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order, supra note 113. Although Anglo-
American public policy generally opposes polygamy, some jurisdictions have been willing
to overlook public policy if no harm would result in doing so. Thus, for example, a California
Court of Appeals found that public policy would not be offended by allowing the surviving
two wives of a decedent in a polygamous marriage to split the intestate share. Kaur v. Boyes,
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A woman’s fractional award shrinks further if the decedent has children.  Consider
the results of a £100,000 estate distributed among a surviving wife, mother, father,
daughter, and two sons.  Islamic law would award the father £16,600 ($26,534.48),119
the mother £16,600 ($26,534.48),120 the daughter £10,800 ($17,269.10),121 each son
£21,600 ($34,538.19),122 leaving the wife only £12,500 ($19,980.03).123  If British
intestacy law applies, the wife would receive the entire £100,000 ($159,832.30)
estate.124  If the decedent leaves four wives rather than one, under Islamic law each
188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (“‘Public policy’ would not be affected by divid-
ing the money equally between the two wives, particularly since there is no contest between
them and they are the only interested parties.”). Neither of the man’s wives contested the right
of the other to share the inheritance, and the law of India, where the marriages were performed,
also would have distributed the spousal share evenly between them. Id. at 499; see also C.H.
SHERRIN & R.C. BONEHILL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION 335 (2d ed.
1994) (“There is in fact no direct authority but it is submitted with some confidence that a party
to a polygamous marriage would be entitled as a husband or wife on the intestacy of the other.”
(internal citation omitted)).
A number of commentators have examined the public policy implications of recognizing
polygamous marriages as valid. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94
IOWA L. REV. 449 (2009) (discussing recognition at the time of the divorce). While courts have
recognized multiple spouses in the context of divorce, it is possible that a court may treat a
polygamous marriage as valid for purposes of qualifying for a social welfare program but not
for inheritance purposes (thus limiting inheritance rights only to the first spouse). However,
I know of no jurisdiction that does this.
Kaur v. Boyes notwithstanding, it is possible that many American jurisdictions would
take the position that in cases of polygamous marriage, the first marriage will be treated as the
only valid one, entitling the first spouse to exclusive spousal inheritance rights, whatever they
may be. In this instance, the application of Islamic law would still remove from the first wife
significant protections accorded to her by civil law. In the United States, she may receive the
entire intestate estate if her husband had children only with her, and in the United Kingdom,
under certain dollar thresholds, she would also receive the entire estate. See supra note 113
and accompanying text. As this Part explains, her share shrinks dramatically if Islamic law
is applied. But if the civil law refused to recognize polygamous marriages, the second, third,
and fourth wives would actually do better if Islamic law was applied. They then would go
from receiving nothing under Anglo-American civil law to receiving, in the case of four wives,
one-sixteenth apiece. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. In families of modest means,
and even many middle-class families, the one-sixteenth fractional share that each wife receives
may not suffice to raise her above the poverty level. Of course, nothing prevents the first wife,
if she receives the entire estate under civil law, from choosing unilaterally to split the estate
with the other wives.
119 See Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:11 (“And for one’s parents, to each one of
them is a sixth of his estate if he left children.”).
120 See id.
121 See id. (“Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, what is equal to
the share of two females.”).
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See The Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order, supra note 113.
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would only inherit a mere £3,000 ($4,795.43) of the estate.125  By contrast, under
British law each wife would receive £25,000 ($39,966.14).126
One final hypothetical drives home the degree to which deference to Islamic law
deliberately and needlessly jeopardizes a widow’s financial security.  Assume upon
a decedent’s death that he leaves a £100,000 estate and is survived by only his wife
and a freed slave.  If a court chose to apply Islamic intestacy law, the wife would re-
ceive £25,000 ($39,966.14) and the freed slave would pocket the remaining £75,000
($119,893.62).127  A court applying British law would award the entire estate to the
widow.128
In short, there are far more protections for dependents provided under British law
than under Islamic law.  And, ultimately under British law, the testator may always
devise the entirety of his estate—something that Qur’anic law precludes.
IV. DOES THE STATE HAVE AN INTEREST HERE?
Some argue that “family law pluralism” allows religious adherents “to opt out of
a jurisdiction’s generally applicable norms and to pre-commit to” their own ethical
conceptions of the good.129  Implicit in this idea is the notion that the State should not
impose protections on those who do not wish to be protected.  Of course, the State
often protects individuals from themselves and exercises especially vigorous oversight
when the relationship is an intimate one.130
This Part considers first whether cultural norms of support will suffice to assuage
concern that women will be impoverished upon divorce if Muslim rules govern the
break-up.  It then asks whether respect for women’s autonomy to choose the application
of Islamic law upon divorce or a spouse’s death can justify removing the protections
afforded by state law.
A. Financial Support for Dependents
In theory, the state should be neutral as to the source of support for vulnerable
dependents so long as some system of support exists for women and children. 
Western ideas of the family generally require spouses to shoulder a duty of support
125 See Surat An-Nisā’, supra note 103, at 4:12.
126 See The Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order, supra note 113; see also supra
note 105 and accompanying text (discussing recognition of multiple wives).
127 This hypothetical is adapted from The Islamic Inheritance Program, supra note 108.
128 See The Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order, supra note 113.
129 See Fadel, supra note 18, at 63.
130 See Brian H. Bix, The ALI Principles and Agreements: Seeking a Balance between Status
and Contract, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 372, 373–74 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed.,
2006) (noting that most U.S. states employ “a more paternalistic and substantive test for en-
forceability” of premarital agreements than would be used for a “commercial agreement”).
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with respect to each other and obligate parents to support their children.131  While
“there is a lack of agreement on just what purpose alimony serves” after divorce, for
some judges “alimony continues the support which the wife was entitled to receive
while the marriage existed.”132
Islam shares with this Western tradition the obligation to provide for one’s wife
during an intact marriage and to provide for children without respect to whether the
parents remain married.133  Some Islamic schools, however, depart from Western
notions regarding what happens upon divorce.  In a number of schools, a divorcing
husband’s obligation to maintain his former wife ends at the end of the iddat period,
mere months after the break-up.134  The duty of support for a divorced woman then
falls to her natal family upon divorce, not her husband.135
In Great Britain, at least, some Muslims rationally have processed the welfare
state’s “readiness to foot the bill” for dependents and have begun to look to that system
for a sister or daughter’s support.136  As Pearl and Menski note, despite the family’s
duty of support, cultural norms have “probably been modified by the impact of the
welfare state.”137  This shifting of the support obligation to the state means that the
state necessarily has an interest in whether husbands make support payments for needy
dependents after divorce, as well as in the size of a widow’s inheritance upon her
husband’s death.
B. Respect for Autonomy
A second argument is frequently advanced to justify a greater role for religious
norms, namely respect for a woman’s autonomy to decide whether religious law will
131 See generally JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION
IN FAMILY LAW (2000) (describing a paradigm shift in the legal and social regulation of the
family from an emphasis on partners’ relationships with each other to an emphasis on parents’
relationships with their children); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 620–21, 252–59 (Student ed., 2d ed. 1988) (describing the scope of
duties between spouses to support each other and their children).
132 CLARK, supra note 131, at 621.
133 Thus, for example, fathers after divorce would provide support to their children as a
function of having custody of them. See supra Figure 1. Husbands also have a duty to provide
for their wives’ support during the marriage. See generally UHLMAN, supra note 18, § 5.4.
134 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
135 PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 27, at 235 (noting that “‘during the waiting period, the
wife is entitled to have full maintenance from the husband or members of his family,’” but that
after the iddat period, the traditional view, in the absence of a welfare state, holds that “the
wife’s natal family has a role to play in maintaining the divorced wife or the widow”) (quoting
Manazir Ahsan, The Muslim Family in Britain, in GOD’S LAW VERSUS STATE LAW: THE




948 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:925
govern.  As Part I illustrates, women face significant inequities in systems of deference. 
Despite these inequities, some scholars maintain that respect for women’s autonomy
can justify a system of deference.138  Others note that prenuptial agreements have long
permitted spouses to privately order their affairs.139
Even jurisdictions most inclined to respect a couple’s autonomy to privately
order their marital affairs will strike an agreement that is coerced or involuntary.140  In
schemes of religious deference, there is every reason to worry that a woman’s “choice”
to have religious authorities decide family matters is not a truly voluntary, independent
one.  Muslim women may feel compelled to participate in Sharia courts because of
their religious and cultural upbringing.  “[G]ender norms that prescribe passivity and
compliance make it difficult for women to enact resistance.”141
Moreover, all the ordinary concerns that courts have over the ability of prospective
spouses to bargain at arm’s length and appreciate the consequences are exacerbated
when a religious body acts as the arbitrator.  Religious groups can exert considerable
influence on their members.142  The systems of deference described in Part I provide
no evidence that women can, or have, resisted such powerful influences.
Publicly available documents from Great Britain’s Islamic Sharia Council do not
explain how the Council ensures that the decision to religiously arbitrate is voluntary
and not coerced.  Canada, which recently scrapped religious arbitration, recommended
forty-six safeguards and reforms to protect vulnerable parties.143  These included public
education “aimed at creating awareness of the legal system, alternative dispute reso-
lution options, and family law provisions;”144 screening parties “separately about
issues of power imbalance and domestic violence, prior to entering into an arbitration
agreement;”145 and protections like those used with prenuptial agreements.146
138 Some scholars have argued that autonomy affords the less powerful an opportunity to
“transform” their communities from within, giving those traditionally vulnerable groups
greater power in the long run. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power
Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385
(2000). Other scholars suggest that granting greater autonomy to cultural groups places the
less powerful in those groups, often women and children, at a further disadvantage. See, e.g.,
Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s Arbitration Act
and Its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 1, 18 (2004) (arguing that, under
Ontario’s Arbitration Act, a “regressive interpretation of Sharia will be used to seriously under-
mine the rights of women”).
139 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 5, at 1250–51 (discussing a proposal to limit the state’s
role to enforcing contracts between private parties); Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 1219.
140 See Bix, supra note 130, at 374.
141 Heidi M. Levitt & Kimberly Ware, “Anything With Two Heads Is a Monster”: Religious
Leaders’ Perspectives on Marital Equality and Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1169, 1170 (2006).
142 See supra Part II.
143 See BOYD, supra note 90, at 133–42.
144 Id. at 138.
145 Id. at 136.
146 See id. at 135.
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Further, even when parties voluntarily agree to a prenuptial, the State polices the
content of the agreement, asking whether it is so odious as to be unconscionable and
something that no reasonable person would accept.147  In twenty-six U.S. jurisdictions,
an agreement’s fairness is evaluated “relative to the time the agreement was signed,”
but in other states fairness is evaluated “relative to the time of enforcement.”148  Given
the staggering financial and custodial consequences of divorce for women in some
religious traditions, one wonders whether any court would enforce a prenuptial agree-
ment with terms like those routinely imposed in systems of deference today.149
In addition to substantive review, ordinary prenuptial agreements are subjected
to exacting review for procedural fairness.  Courts often require voluntariness, com-
plete disclosure, representation by separate counsel, and other procedural protections
before the agreement may be enforced against the parties.150  One crucial safeguard
to ensure that the parties have knowingly bound themselves to a specific, shared under-
standing in advance is that the agreement be in writing.  Fadel urges that religious
deference allows believers to pre-commit to certain conceptions of the good.151  Yet,
as Part I details, Muslim understandings of family relationships are not a monolithic
whole and can differ in nuanced but material ways from place to place and group to
group.  Because the ethical conceptions of the good are not always committed to writ-
ing in advance, questions immediately arise about the congruence between the parties’
understandings ex ante and the rules applied ex post by arbitrators.  Questions also
arise about whether like cases will be treated alike.
Family violence only exacerbates the risks to vulnerable parties.  Given the routine
acceptance of family violence by some religious communities,152 it seems unlikely that
these communities will relax the application of harsh financial understandings in cases
of violence—as courts routinely do when there is a material change in circumstances
after a prenuptial agreement’s execution.153  Nor is it clear that women will be allowed
to exit abusive relationships at all, as Ameena’s case illustrates.154
Ayelet Shachar observes that violations of individual rights “in the identity group
context” are sometimes justified by a supposed “right of exit” from the group ratio-
nale.155  As she notes, “the right of exit rationale forces an insider into a cruel choice
147 See Bix, supra note 130, at 373–74.
148 Id. at 374 (citations omitted).
149 See supra Part I; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in
American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 557, 569–77 (2004) (discussing substantive
limitations on enforcement of prenuptial agreements that affect child welfare or other public
policies, but noting that courts have enforced some financial agreements). Some courts limit
enforcement to agreements that are capable of specific performance under “neutral principles
of law.” See, e.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95–96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002).
150 Bix, supra note 130, at 373–74.
151 See Fadel, supra note 18, at 77–82.
152 See supra Part II.B.
153 See Bix, supra note 130, at 373–74.
154 See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
155 AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
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of penalties: either accept all group practices—including those that violate your
fundamental citizenship rights—or (somehow) leave.”156  Shachar states that “this
‘solution’ never considers that obstacles such as economic hardship, lack of education,
skills deficiencies, or emotional distress may make exit all but impossible for some.”157 
Just as women cannot easily exit the community as a means to protect their interests,
they cannot easily resist the “choice” to arbitrate.  More fundamentally, the state should
not subject these women to such impossible choices.
C. Evaluating Possible Regulatory Responses
These welfare concerns powerfully indict the whole enterprise of applying reli-
gious norms to family matters.  Perhaps most problematic is the ceding of jurisdiction
to religious bodies over family questions because the risks to vulnerable women and
children are so great.  Western Thrace demonstrates not only that religious norms will
significantly disadvantage women, but that there will be few checks on decisions at
the back end.158
The harder question here is whether to allow religious arbitration if a woman wants
her pastor or imam or priest to arbitrate family matters using religious norms.  Two
overarching concerns require a regulatory response: first, the possibility of “forced,”
not truly voluntary participation, and second the possibility of harsh or unconscionable
outcomes.  As with any enterprise, the state can address these concerns ex ante or
ex post.  If the state regulates ex ante, it could police the circumstances under which
arbitration may occur or police entry into arbitration.  It might, for example, follow the
Canadian model and permit arbitration by religious figures using only civil law.159 
That regulatory approach mutes the concern about unconscionable outcomes for
women but does not remove it entirely.  The significant tolerance for violence in the
family by fundamentalist religious believers means that the state would nonetheless
have to police the substantive judgments arrived at in those proceedings to prevent
overreaching.  On the entry side, the state might also require proof that a woman vol-
untarily elects to participate in arbitration.  This safeguard seems grossly inadequate
in the face of cultural and religious norms that define good believers as ones who
accept such unconscionable outcomes.160  Presumably, very few religious leaders and
adherents would embrace religious arbitration on these terms.
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 41 (2001).
156 Id.
157 Id. (citation omitted).
158 See supra Part I.B.
159 Wilson, supra note 5 (manuscript at 50–51) (discussing Canada’s ban on religious
arbitration using religious rules).
160 In Canada, for example, one Muslim leader said that foregoing religious arbitration
would make one a “bad Muslim”:
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The state can also address the possibility of harm from religious arbitration ex
post.  In this scheme, for example, it could police the substantive judgments reached
in arbitration with robust public policy limitations that place out of bounds certain sub-
stantive outcomes.161  This approach imposes on parties who are likely to be harmed,
women, a duty to trigger this substantive review.  Yet the same people that the state
would require to trigger this review—divorced women—may not understand that
they have been disadvantaged by the application of religious norms.  Neither may they
understand or be empowered to resist those norms given the importance of religious
identity to them in their lives.  This approach also would require a series of judgments
by the state about when women can be made too poor as a result of divorce or be too
trapped in an abusive marriage or be too threatened by the possibility of losing access
As Canadian Muslims, you have a clear choice. Do you want to govern
yourself by the personal law of your own religion, or do you prefer gov-
ernance by secular Canadian family law? If you choose the latter, then
you cannot claim that you believe in Islam as a religion and a complete
code of life actualized by a Prophet who you believe to be a mercy to all.
Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Canadian Society of Muslims,
(August 1995), http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm.
161 Compare EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 25 (2006) (“[T]he lengthy history of the public policy exception represents a
perception that society would oppose an arbitration system in which courts would enforce
awards blatantly inconsistent with public policy. . . . [While] the public policy exception is
not explicitly within the text of the [U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, it] does exist in case law
as part of American arbitration doctrine.”), with THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 396 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the availability of judicial relief
from unjust arbitral awards and concluding that such relief is only available in cases involving
procedural deficiencies, including “manifest disregard of the law, irrationality, and violations
of public policy”).
Even if a court possesses the right to review, it may be loath to set aside an arbitral award.
Here, the 2006 case of a Hmong couple who voluntarily arbitrated their divorce with Hmong
elders is illustrative. The Hmong are an ethnic group from Laos. See JANE HAMILTON-
MERRITT, TRAGIC MOUNTAINS: THE HMONG, THE AMERICANS, AND THE SECRET WARS FOR
LAOS, 1942–1992, at 4–5 (1993). When the couple, Maixee and Phia Vue, began divorce
proceedings, they agreed to have their dissolution disputes settled by a panel of seven Hmong
elders in accordance with Hmong beliefs. Vue v. Vue, No. A05-728, 2006 WL 279070, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2006). In order to do this, they signed an arbitration agreement, which
provided for review by the divorce court in certain circumstances, such as when the arbitrators
exceed their power, or are clearly partial, or when the arbitration award is obtained by fraud.
Id.; MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2000). The parties had independent counsel when they requested
arbitration before the Hmong panel. Arbitration proceeded over the next year, with seven meet-
ings of the panel. Vue, supra, at *1–*2. After settlement, Maixee Vue moved to vacate the
award, claiming, among other things, that allowing the Hmong panel to arbitrate was against
public policy and resulted in an inequitable settlement. Id. at *2. The court could “discern
no public policy that prohibits the parties from agreeing to have their legal issues decided by
an arbitration panel according to Hmong culture and tradition” and refused to set aside the
judgment. Id. at *3.
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to their children.  Obviously some of these judgments have already been made in the
context of prenuptial agreements—for instance, that decisions regarding children
cannot be removed from state oversight—but a robust theory of substantive floors,
below which the state will not allow religious arbitration to go, means that questions
of financial and physical vulnerability would have to be addressed as well.162
CONCLUSION
States should weigh carefully the risks to women and children before ceding
jurisdiction over family matters to bodies that may be unwilling or unable to vindi-
cate their rights.  The movement to introduce religious fundamentalism into the family
will have dire consequences for traditionally dependent groups, women and children,
who are deserving of the state’s protection.
The state plays an important role in protecting traditionally vulnerable groups,
who are themselves minorities within minorities.163  Binding women who want to
exit a marriage to a religious community’s norms—whether by enforcing religious
arbitrations or ceding jurisdiction over family disputes to religious authorities—will
erect a barrier to exit for many women and prevent them from privately regulating
conduct toward themselves and their children.
Governments should be equally wary of authorizing inequitable results upon a
husband’s death.  Some religious schools cap a woman’s inheritance, both by will and
by intestacy, at a fraction of the decedent’s estate, plunging these women into cer-
tain poverty upon their husbands’ death.  At the same time, norms in some religious
communities have morphed so that family members who once would have provided
support to women in need now shift this responsibility to the state.
The foreseeable inequities to women and children in systems of religious defer-
ence cannot be justified on grounds that a woman voluntarily chooses to participate
or that others will step up and provide support.  Existing systems of religious defer-
ence strip women and children of safeguards, evolved over decades, to protect them
in times of crisis from abject poverty and disruption of the parent-child relationship. 
Policymakers should proceed cautiously before handing over authority for family
matters to religious bodies that will rob women and children of these protections.
162 In such a system, it would be useful to collect arbitral judgments so that the state can
monitor outcomes across cases as well as on a case-by-case basis. This would surface inequities
against women but might also incentivize incremental improvement in the substantive out-
comes for women in Sharia courts. In other words, if the Sharia courts know they are operating
in the shadow of a state generally suspicious of certain Islamic precepts and outcomes, it may
lead to gradual liberalization of their laws.
163 Shachar, supra note 138, at 386 (“Well-meaning accommodation policies by the state . . .
may unwittingly allow systematic maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated minor-
ity group—an impact, in certain cases, so severe that it nullifies these individuals’ rights as
citizens.” (internal citations omitted)).
